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Strictly proper scoring rules (SPSR) are widely used when designing incentive mechanisms to elicit private
information from strategic agents using realized ground truth signals, and they can help quantify the value of
elicited information. In this paper, we extend such scoring rules to settings where a mechanism designer does
not have access to ground truth. We consider two such settings: (i) a setting when the mechanism designer has
access to a noisy proxy version of the ground truth, with known biases; and (ii) the standard peer prediction
setting where agents’ reports, and possibly some limited prior knowledge of ground truth, are the only source
of information that the mechanism designer has.
We introduce surrogate scoring rules (SSR) for the first setting, which use the noisy ground truth to evaluate
quality of elicited information. We show that SSR preserves the strict properness of SPSR. Using SSR, we
then develop a multi-task scoring mechanism – called uniform dominant truth serum (DTS) – to achieve strict
properness when there are sufficiently many tasks and agents, and when the mechanism designer only has
access to agents’ reports and one bit information about the marginal of the entire set of tasks’ ground truth. In
comparison to standard equilibrium concepts in peer prediction, we show that DTS can achieve truthfulness
in uniform dominant strategy in a multi-task setting when agents adopt the same strategy for all the tasks that
they are assigned (hence the term uniform). A salient feature of SSR and DTS is that they quantify the quality
of information despite lack of ground truth, just as proper scoring rules do for the with verification setting.
Our method is verified both theoretically and empirically using data collected from real human participants.
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11 INTRODUCTION
Strictly proper scoring rules (SPSR) [1–8] have been developed to elicit private information (e.g.
probability assessment of whether the S & P 500 index will go up next week) and evaluate the
reported information for settings where the principal will have access to the ground truth (e.g.
whether S & P 500 index actually went up) at some point. The score of an agent measures the
quality of his prediction. Moreover, facing a strictly proper scoring rule, an agent strictly maximizes
his expected score by truthfully revealing his prediction.
When it comes to information elicitationwithout verification (IEWV), settings where the principal
does not have access to the ground truth and still wants to elicit private information (e.g. in peer
grading, whether a student’s homework solution is correct is unavailable as otherwise peer grading
is not needed), existing mechanisms have achieved less in terms of both quantifying the quality
of reported information and incentivizing truthful information revelation. An elegant family of
mechanisms [9–18], collectively called peer prediction, has been developed for IEWV. Peer prediction
leverages the correlation of agents’ private signals and scores an agent’s report based on how
it compares with the reports from other agents. In other words, the peer prediction score of an
agent measures the correlation of his report with those of others, but it doesn’t reflect the report’s
true quality with respect to the ground truth. Furthermore, peer prediction incentivizes truthfully
reporting at a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). An agent reports truthfully when all other agents
are truthful, but if some other agents are not truthful, then the agent can benefit from misreporting
his information.1
We focus on information elicitation without verification in this paper and ask: Can we design
scoring mechanisms to quantify the quality of information as SPSR do and achieve truthful elicitation
in a certain form of dominant strategy for IEWV? We provide a positive answer to this question for
binary information elicitation. Two specific IEWV settings are considered. The first setting is when
the principal has access to a random variable that is a noisy or proxy version of the ground truth,
with known biases. The second setting is the standard peer prediction setting where agents’ reports
are the only source of information that the principal has.
For the first setting, we introduce surrogate scoring rules (SSR), which use the noisy ground
truth to evaluate quality of elicited information, and show that SSR preserve the same information
quantification and achieve truthful elicitation just as SPSR despite the lack of access to the ground
truth. These surrogate scoring rules are inspired by the use of surrogate loss functions in machine
learning [20–24] and they remove bias from the noisy random variable such that in expectation a
report is as if evaluated against the ground truth.
Built upon SSR, in the second setting where the principal only has access to agents’ reports
and one bit of information about the marginal of entire set of tasks’ ground truth, we develop
a multi-agent, multi-task mechanism, the uniform dominant truth serum (DTS), to again achieve
information quantification and truthful elicitation in a uniform dominant strategy where agents
adopt the same (arbitrary) strategy for all the tasks they are assigned, and when the mechanism
designer has sufficiently many tasks and agents. The method relies on an estimation procedure
to accurately estimate the average bias in the reports of other agents. With the estimation, a
random peer agent’s report serves as a noisy ground truth and SSR can then be applied to achieve
information quantification as SPSR and truthful elicitation in dominant strategy. Finally, we evaluate
DTS (i) on 7 human-generated judgement datasets and demonstrate that DTS scores (without access
1Peer prediction also suffers from multiplicity of equilibria as there are other non-truthful BNE. In experiments, non-
truthful equilibria were found to be reached more often than the truthful equilibrium [19]. Several recent peer prediction
mechanisms [15, 17, 18] have made truthful equilibrium focal in the sense that it leads to the highest expected payoff to
agents among all equilibria. But there is at least one other equilibrium that gives the same expected payoff to agents.
2 2 INTRODUCTION
to the ground truth) rank reports similarly as the SPSR scores (with the ground truth), and (ii) on a
large scale human prediction data collected from a forecast competition. Our results show that the
DTS scores can approximate the true average Brier scores achieved by the participants well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We will survey the most relevant results in the rest
of this section. Section 2 lays out the preliminaries. Formulations of our elicitation problem is given
in Section 3. We introduce surrogate scoring rules in Section 4. A uniform dominant truth serum is
proposed in Section 5 for eliciting information for the peer prediction setting. Our experimental
results on a set of real human participant data are presented in Section 6. This paper is concluded
with Section 7. We include the key and most proofs in the Appendix. Missing details and proofs
can be found in the Additional Material at the end of this draft.
1.1 Related work
The most relevant literature to our paper is strictly proper scoring rules and peer prediction. Scoring
rules were developed for eliciting truthful prediction (probability) [1, 3, 7, 8, 25, 26]. For example, the
pioneer works [1] proposed Brier scoring to verify the qualities of forecasts. A full characterization
result is given for strictly proper scoring rules in [2, 6, 8]. The core idea of peer prediction is to score
each agent based on another reference report elicited from the rest of agents, and to leverage on
the stochastic correlation between different agents’ information. This line of research started with
the celebrated Bayesian Truth Serum work [9], where a surprisingly popular answer methodology
is shown to be able to incentivize agents to truthfully report even when they believe they hold
the minority answer (but more likely to be true in their own opinion). The seminal work [10]
established that strictly proper scoring rule [8] can be adopted in the peer prediction setting for
eliciting truthful reports (but the mechanism designer needs to know details of agents’ model); a
sequence of follow-up works have been done to relax the assumptions that have been imposed
therein [12–18]. Our work complements both the strictly proper scoring rules literature by solving
the case where the mechanism designer only has access to a noisy or proxy version of the ground
truth or only unverified reports from agents, and the peer prediction literature by achieving truthful
elicitation in dominant strategy.
A recent line of works, including [27–30], have also focused on establishing dominant strategy
for IEWV. [27, 28, 30] require access to a certain number of ground truth answers, while [29]
requires each agent to perform infinite number of tasks. We relax the above requirements, and
besides achieving the incentive property, we aim to establish a scoring method that quantifies the
value of information and achieves the same calibration as the strictly proper scoring rules do with
accessing to ground truth. This capability helps us to identify experts without accessing the ground
truth information. This is also demonstrated in our experimental section.
As mentioned, our work borrows ideas from the machine learning literature on learning with
noisy data [21, 23, 24, 31, 32]. From the high-level perspective, our goal in this paper aligns with
the goal in learning from noisy labels - both aim to evaluate a prediction when the ground truth
is missing, but instead a noisy signal of the ground truth is available. Our work addresses the
additional challenge that the error rate of the noisy signal remains unknown a priori.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Prior work on information elicitation typically considers one of two types of information: private
signals and private beliefs (i.e. probabilistic predictions). In this paper, we develop mechanisms
that apply to both cases.
2.2 Strictly proper scoring rules 3
2.1 Model of information
Suppose we are interested in eliciting information about a binary event y ∈ {0, 1} from a set of
human agents, indexed by [N ] := {1, 2, ...,N }. Each of the N agents holds a noisy observation of y,
denoting as si . Agents’ observations are conditionally independent: Pr[si , sj |y] = Pr[si |y] · Pr[sj |y].
We short-hand the following error rates: e1,i := Pr[si = 0|y = 1], e0,i := Pr[si = 1|y = 0], i.e.,
e1,i , e0,i are the error probabilities of agent i’s observation for y. We do not assume homogeneous
agents, that is we allow agents to have different e1,i , e0,i . The error rates can also model subjectivity
in agents’ private belief and observation. Based on signal si , each agent can form a posterior belief
about y, denoting as pi := Pr[y = 1|si ]. When there are multiple tasks, we assume the realization
of (across) the events has prior distribution P0 := Pr[y = 0], P1 = Pr[y = 1]. Suppose this prior
distribution is non-trivial that 0 < P0,P1 < 1. We further assume each agent’s error rates, e1,i and
e0,i , are homogeneous across tasks.2
We consider eliciting either si orpi from agents,3 butwe are not able to access the ground truthy to
verify the reported information from agents. We call the elicitation of these two types of information
as signal elicitation and prediction elicitation respectively. The literature on proper scoring rules
has been primarily considering prediction elicitation, while the literature on peer prediction has
focused on signal elicitation. To unify both types of information, we denote the information space
as I, and each agent’s information as Ii . For signal elicitation, Ii = si and I = {0, 1}. For prediction
elicitation, Ii = pi and I = [0, 1]. Denote agent i’s report to a mechanism as ai ∈ I . For signal
elicitation and prediction elicitation, we have ai : si → {0, 1} and ai : pi → [0, 1], respectively.
As a fact of the conditional independence among si and above formulation, agents’ reports satisfy
conditional independence too: ∀i , j: P[ai ,aj |y] = P[ai |y] · P[aj |y], ∀y. Note agents can simply
choose to ignore their observations and “collude" by always reporting 0 or 1: P[ai = 1,aj = 1|y] = 1
and P[ai = 1|y] = 1, P[aj = 1|y] = 1 (always reporting 1)⇒ P[ai ,aj |y] = P[ai |y] · P[aj |y].
2.2 Strictly proper scoring rules
Many of our results build upon strictly proper scoring rules. We go through the basics of its setup.
Strictly proper scoring rules were designed to elicit predictions, i.e. the pi ’s. A scoring function
S : [0, 1] × {0, 1} → R+ is strictly proper if and only if
E[S(pi ,y)] > E[S(p˜i ,y)], ∀p˜i , pi ,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the agent’s belief Pr[y |si ]. There is a rich family of
strictly proper scoring rules, including Brier (S(pi ,y) = 1 − (pi − y)2), logarithmic and spherical
scoring rules [8].
Though not enjoying much attention in the literature, the above idea of defining strictly proper
scoring rules also applies to signal elicitation, that is to design a function S : {0, 1}2 → R+ such that
E[S(si ,y)] > E[S(s˜i ,y)], ∀s˜i , si . For instance, with knowledge of the priors Pr[y = s], s ∈ {0, 1},
the following prior dependent output agreement scoring function is strictly proper:
(1/Prior): S(s˜i ,y) = 1Pr[y = s˜i ] · 1(s˜i = y).
Lemma 2.1. 1/Prior scoring function is strictly proper.
2This assumption is mainly needed for learning purposes. We provide a justification in the full version that this homogeneous
assumption is a linear approximation of the heterogeneous case. We also show with real human data that this assumption is
reasonable in multiple different settings.
3For clarity of presentation, we assume that we elicit the same type of information from all agents. But our work can be
extended to a mixed elicitation setting.
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We are not aware of other scoring functions for signal elicitation in the literature, except that
we can adapt the strictly proper scoring rules aided peer prediction function to elicit signals, via
replacing the reference signal with ground truth signal [10] - but this will require the mechanism
designer to know the posterior distribution of agents’ signals. For instance, to differentiate let us
denote the scoring function for signal elicitation as Ssignal(), then
Ssignal(s˜i ,y = s) = S(Pr[y = s |s˜i ],y = s)
for a strictly proper scoring function.
To unify prediction and signal elicitation, we will denote a strictly proper scoring rule for eliciting
agent i’s information Ii as
S(ai ,y) : I × {0, 1} → R+.
2.3 Value of information with strictly proper scoring rules
To a certain degree, it’s known that SRSR quantify the value/accuracy of reported predictions.
We give a rigorous argument. First by representation theorem [2, 6], we know that any strictly
proper scoring function for prediction elicitation can be characterized using a corresponding convex
function G which further gives us the following representation [8]:
S(p,y) = G(ey ) − DG (ey ,p),
where ey is a vector with 1 for the component corresponding to outcome y and 0 elsewhere. DG is
the Bregman divergence corresponding to function G:
DG (ey ,p) = G(ey ) −G(p) − ▽G(p) · (ey − p),
and ▽G(p) is a subgradient of G. Taking expectation with respect to the true distribution of y we
have
Ey [S(p,y)] = Ey [G(ey )] − Ey [DG (ey ,p)],
which gives us the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2. For a strictly proper scoring rule S and its corresponding function G , a prediction
p with smaller divergence “score" Ey [DG (ey ,p)] will have a higher score in S in true expectation.
Therefore Ey [DG (ey ,p)] captures the value of information for p under S . Intuitively speaking,
the quantify characterizes how “far away" p is from the true distribution under divergence function
D. When S is taken as the Brier scoring rule, the corresponding Bregman divergence is simply the
quadratic function. Denoting the true distribution of y as p∗, then Ey [DG (ey ,p)] = | |p∗ − p | |2, i.e.,
the prediction with a smaller l2 norm (w.r.t. p∗) will enjoy a higher score in expectation.
For signal elicitation, there is very little characterization results. If we use strictly proper scoring
rules aided peer prediction function [10], agent’s scores are characterized again by DG evaluated at
the posterior distributions of his reported signal. For 1/Prior scoring rule, we prove the following:
Theorem 2.3. For 1/Prior scores, workers with smaller weighted sum-of-errors
1 − p∗
Pr[y = 0] · e0,i +
p∗
Pr[y = 1] · e1,i
receive higher scores in expectation, i.e., e1,i , e0,i quantify the value of information for 1/Prior scores.
These quantifications can help the designer evaluate experts and rank them according to their
performances.
3 ELICITATIONWITHOUT VERIFICATION
We formulate our elicitation problem in two settings, both without ground truth verification.
3.2 Model of elicitation with peer reports 5
3.1 Model of elicitation with noisy ground truth
The first elicitation setting is when the mechanism designer has access to the realization of a binary
random variable z ∈ {0, 1}, which is a noisy or proxy version of the ground truth with known bias.
The bias of z is again captured by the error rates: e1,z := Pr[z = 0|y = 1], e0,z := Pr[z = 1|y = 0].We
cannot expect to do much if z is independent of y and hence assume that z and y are stochastically
relevant, an assumption commonly adopted in the information elicitation literature [10].
Definition 3.1. z and y are stochastically relevant if there exists an s ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[y =
s |z = 0] , Pr[y = s |z = 1].
The following lemma shows that the stochastic relevance requirement directly translates to a
constraint on the error rates, that is, e1,z + e0,z , 1.
Lemma 3.2. y and z are stochastically relevant if and only if e1,z + e0,z , 1. And y and z are
stochastically irrelevant (independent) if and only if e1,z + e0,z = 1.
Our goal is to design a scoring function φ : I × {0, 1} → R+ that satisfies that there exists a
strictly proper scoring rule S and a strictly increasing function f : R+ → R+ such that
∀ai , Ey,z [φ(ai , z)] = f (Ey [S(ai ,y)]).
For instance, a simple such f to aim for can be an affine function that there exist two constants
c1 > 0, c2 such that Ey,z [φ(ai , z)] = c1 · Ey [S(ai ,y)] + c2.
If our goal is achieved, we have preserved the same order of quantification of information as
strictly proper scoring rules do, due to the monotonicity of f (·). Further with defining the strict
properness for this setting with noisy ground truth:
Strict properness with noisy ground truth: E[φ(Ii , z)] > E[φ(ai , z)], ∀ai , Ii , (1)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the agent’s subjective belief Pr[z |si ], the strict
properness and a dominate strategy elicitation of φ(·) hold immediately because of the strict
properness of S and the monotonicity of f (·).
3.2 Model of elicitation with peer reports
The second elicitation setting is close to the standard setting considered in the peer prediction
literature. Here the only source of information that the mechanism designer has access to is the
agents’ reports. There are multiple tasks in this setting. Each task k has a ground truth y(k) that is
independently drawn according to prior P0 and P1. We make a technical assumption that P0 , P1.4
We adopt the standard assumption requiring that each agent’s signal si (k) and the ground truth
y(k) are stochastically relevant, i.e. e1,i + e0,i , 1. Moreover, we assume that signals are Bayesian
informative ofy(k), that is, Pr[y(k) = s |si (k) = s] > Pr[y(k) = s], ∀i, s . In other words, the posterior
probability for y(k) = s is greater than the prior probability of y(k) = s if an agent receives a signal
s . This assumption has been adopted by [10, 15], and has been shown by [33] to be equivalent to a
constraint on the error rates:
Lemma 3.3. (Lemma 2.1 in [33]) si (k) is Bayesian informative of y if and only if e1,i + e0,i < 1.
The case with e1,i + e0,i > 1 can be viewed as negative Bayesian informative as flipping one’s
observation will return a Bayesian informative signal. In this paper we focus only on settings where
every agent’s signal is Bayesian informative of y. But this assumption is to simplify presentation as
our results hold for negative Bayesian informative agents, as well as for a mixed population.
4In practice, with multiple tasks, we can perturb the marginal distribution by adding some tasks with known labels to (or
deleting task from) either of the two classes.
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Each task will be randomly assigned to three agents. Suppose agent i receives ni tasks. We do
not require each agent to take on a large number of tasks. In particular, when the total number of
agents is large, on average each agent only receives a small number of tasks (for instance, ni ≤ 2).
We denote agent i’s private information as Ii (n),n = 1, ...,ni for the ni tasks. Suppose each agent i
incurs the same error rates e1,i , e0,1 across all tasks assigned to him.
We use σi : I → ∆(I) to denote agent i’s reporting strategy, where ∆(I) is the simplex over the
information space. Let ai (n;σi ) ∼ σi (Ii (n)),n = 1, ...,ni denote agent i’s realized reports following
his strategy σi . By this, we have also assumed that each agent follows the same reporting strategy
for all tasks he is assigned. We’d like to emphasize that neither the homogeneous error rates nor
the same reporting strategy assumption is very restrictive when ni is small, which is the case in our
setting. Dealing with task-dependent strategies is a challenging (if not impossible) task as noted in
the literature of multi-task peer prediction literature [15, 34].
Denote by D−i the set of information collected from agents j , i who play some (unknown)
strategies {σj }j,i , i.e. D−i := {aj (n;σj ),n = 1, ...,nj }j,i . For this part, our goal is to find a ref-
erence signal zD−i ∈ {0, 1}5 for each ai (n;σi ), as a function of D−i , and a scoring function
φD−i (ai (n;σi ), zD−i ) : I × {0, 1} → R+, also as a function of D−i , such that when zD−i is in-
formative, there exists a strictly proper scoring rule S : I × {0, 1} → R+ and a strictly increasing
function f : R+ → R+ s.t.
Ey,zD−i [φD−i (ai (n;σi ), zD−i )] = f (Ey [S(ai (n;σi ),y)]),
∀i,∀σi ,∀ai (n;σi ), and ∀n, and S is only required to be proper if zD−i is uninformative.
If the above holds, besides preserving the quantification of information, it is proper for agent i to
truthfully reveal his private information regardless of other agents’ strategies6. Then
Uniform multi-task properness w/ peer reports: E[φD−i (Ii (n), zD−i )] ≥ E[φD−i (ai (n;σi ), zD−i )],
∀i,∀n,∀σj , j , i , and ∀ai (n;σi ) and when zD−i is informative about y, it is strictly proper for agent
i to truthfully reveal his private information: ∀i,∀n,∀σj , j , i,∀ai (n;σi ) , Ii (n),
E[φD−i (Ii (n), zD−i )] > E[φD−i (ai (n;σi ), zD−i )], (2)
which we name as uniform multi-task strict properness. In above, the expectation is taken
with respect to the agent’s subjective belief Pr[zD−i |Ii (n)]. Note we haven’t restricted how σj ’s are
chosen by agents j , i . The above conditions need to hold for any strategy profile {σj }j,i . Thus,
for the Bayesian games that agents are playing, the above conditions require that for any strategy
profile of other agents it is the best strategy for agent i to report his information truthfully. Thus,
truthful reporting is a uniform dominant strategy in this multi-task Bayesian game. We
note that however the above conditions do not mean that truthful reporting is an ex-post dominant
strategy after the reports of other agents are realized. In fact, in information elicitation settings
(even with ground truth), it’s impossibly to achieve truthfulness as an ex-post dominant strategy.
(Once the outcome or reference report is known, it’s always better to report the same rather than
report one’s information.) We summarize the above observation in the following impossibility
results.
Theorem 3.4. In IEWV, it is impossible to achieve strict non-uniform dominant strategy in truthful
reporting.
5Potentially different zD−i is needed for ai (n;σi ) with different n, but we will treat each ai (n;σi ) separately and will not
overload z with the n identifier.
6Intuitively when zD−i is uninformative about y , we can’t hope for strict properness.
7In above, the non-uniform dominant strategy releases our assumption that agents need to follow
the same strategy for all the tasks they have been assigned. The reason is that with a non-uniform
strategy space, agents can specify arbitrary combinations of strategies for each task to recover any
ex-post realization, in which case it is impossible to induce truthfulness in information elicitation.
We leave the detailed argument in Appendix.
When it’s clear in context, we’ll use z as shorthand for zD−i and φ for φD−i .
3.2.1 Knowledge of agents and the mechanism designer. For signal elicitation, agents do not need
to be aware of their own values of e1,i and e0,i , but they need to know that their own signals are
Bayesian informative. For prediction elicitation, agents need to know their own values of e1,i and
e0,i to form their predictions. The above knowledge does not need to be common knowledge among
agents. This is because we seek to achieve dominant strategy truthfulness and hence agents are as
if not playing a Bayesian game against each other. The mechanism designer knows the priors of
distribution of ground truth P0,P1, i.e., we know among 100 images roughly 60 of them are of label
1, but not the realized y (which 60 are 1), nor the private information si ’s or pi ’s. This assumption
for now is for the ease of presentation. Later, as well as in the Appendix, we will show that we do
not require the exact knowledge of P0,P1. Instead we only need to know an indicator function of
1(P0 > 0.5). We’d like to emphasize again P0 is not the prior for any of the task, but rather it’s
a marginal over the entire set of tasks. Further the designer does not know any of the biases of
agents’ information, e1,i and e0,i , a-priori.
4 SURROGATE SCORING RULES
In this section we first introduce surrogate scoring rules (SSR) for the setting where the elicitation is
done with noisy ground truth - we will name the scoring functions that meet our goals defined in
Section 3.1 as surrogate scoring rules.
Definition 4.1 (Surrogate Scoring Rules). φ : I×{0, 1} → R+ is a surrogate scoring rule if for some
strictly proper scoring rule S : I × {0, 1} → R+ and a strictly increasing function f : R+ → R+
such that ∀ai , Ey,z [φ(ai , z)] = f (Ey [S(ai ,y)]).
The above definition seeks a surrogate scoring function φ(·) that helps us remove the bias in z to
return us a strictly proper score in expectation. The idea is borrowed from the machine learning
literature on learning with noisy data [21, 23, 24, 31, 32]. SSR can be viewed as a particular class of
proxy scoring rules [35]. But the approach of [35] to achieve properness is to plug in an unbiased
proxy ground truth to a strictly proper scoring rule. SSR on the other hand directly work with
biased proxy and the scoring function is designed to de-bias the noise. Easily we have the strict
properness of SSR:
Theorem 4.2. SSR is strictly proper for eliciting Ii ∀ agent i .
We give an implementation of SSR, which we name as SSR_alpha:
φ(ai , z = o) = (1 − e1−o,z ) · S(ai ,o) − eo,z · S(ai , 1 − o)1 − e1,z − e0,z , (3)
where in above S can be any strictly proper scoring rule. Eqn. (3) is well defined due to the fact that
z is informative and Lemma 3.2. From above we note that the knowledge of the error rates e1,z , e0,z
is crucial for defining a SSR. The above scoring function is inspired by the work [23]. Intuitively
speaking, the linear transform will ensure that in expectation, ai is scored against y:
Lemma 4.3 (Lemma 1, [23]). For (SSR_alpha): Ez |y [φ(ai , z)] = S(ai ,y),∀y, e1,z + e0,z < 1.
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This can be proved fairly straightforwardly via spelling out the expectation. Interested readers
are also referred to [23]. We would like to note that other surrogate loss functions designed for
learning with noisy labels can also be leveraged to design SSR.
Theorem 4.4. (SSR_alpha) is strictly proper, and Ez [φ(ai , z)] = Ey [S(ai ,y)],∀i .
With Theorem 4.4 we know that (SSR_alpha) quantifies the quality of information just as the
strictly proper scoring rule S does. Nonetheless, (SSR_alpha) has a variance that is inversely
proportional to 1 − e1,z − e0,z :
Theorem 4.5. (SSR_alpha) suffers the following variance:
Ez
[
φ(ai , z) − Ez [φ(ai , z)]
]2
=
(S(ai , 1) − S(ai , 0))2 · Ez
[P1−z (1 − e1,z − e0,z ) + ez,z ]2
(1 − e1,z − e0,z )2 . (4)
5 UNIFORM DOMINANT TRUTH SERUM
The results in the previous section are built upon the fact that there exists a reference signal for
the ground truth and we know its error rates. In this section, we apply the idea of SSR to the peer
prediction setting. A reasonable way to do so is to take agents’ reports as the source for this noisy
copy of the ground truth. Yet the mechanism designer cannot assume the knowledge of the noise
in agents’ reports.
We select the reference report z uniformly randomly from agents j , i . Denote by er1,i , er0,i the
error rate of agent i’s reported information ais 7. For the signal elicitation setting, for instance
when agents truthfully report, i.e. ai (n;σi ) = si (n), we have er1,i = e1,i , er0,i = e0,i . For prediction
elicitation, we can similarly define a signal from agent i (denoting as pri (n;σi )), via drawing a
random sample according to his reported prediction: asi (n;σi ) ∼ Bernoulli(pri (n;σi )). In this case,
we will still call such a asi (n;σi ) as agent i’s “signal" but we should keep in mind this signal is
randomly drawn from his reported prediction, instead of being deterministic. We similarly define
er1,i , e
r
0,i for asi (n;σi ). Then e1,z and e0,z can be characterized as follows:
e1,z :=
∑
j,i
er1, j/(N − 1), e0,z :=
∑
j,i
er0, j/(N − 1).
The next subsection will detail the steps towards estimating e0,z , e1,z . Note if we know the average
error rates when agents truthfully report, the SSR already give us an equilibrium implementation
of truthful elicitation - as in the equilibrium argument, every other agent will truthfully report.
5.1 Bias learning with matching
Our learning algorithm for inferring e0,z , e1,z relies on establishing three equations towards charac-
terizing e1,z , e0,z . We will first show that the three equations, with knowing their true parameters,
together will uniquely define e1,z , e0,z . Then we argue that with estimated and imperfect parameters
from agents’ reports, the solution from the perturbed set of equations will approximate the true
values of e1,z , e0,z , with guaranteed accuracy.
(1) Posterior distribution: The first equation is based on the posterior distribution of 0/1 labels
collected in D−i , denoting as P0,−i := Pr[z = 0], P1,−i := Pr[z = 1]. P0,−i can be characterized as,
via spelling out conditional expectation:
P0,−i = P1 · Pr[z = 0|y = 1] + P0 · Pr[z = 0|y = 0] = P1e1,z + P0(1 − e0,z ). (5)
7er1,i , e
r
0,i will be the same across ai (n;σi ), due to the assumption of same reporting strategy.
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(2)Matching between two signals: The second equation is derived from a second order stat-
istics, namely the matching probability. Consider the following experiments: draw two signals
randomly (for the same task, but from two agents) from the reference agents, denote them as z1, z2.
Denote the matching-on-1 probability of the two signals as Pr[z1 = 1, z2 = 1] := q2,−i . Further the
matching probability can be written as a function of e0,z , e1,z : the quadratic terms are due to the
fact that agents’ reports are conditionally independent on ground truth:
q2,−i = P1 · Pr[z1 = 1, z2 = 1|y = 1] + P0 · Pr[z1 = 1, z2 = 1|y = 0]
= P1 · Pr[z1 = 1|y = 1] · Pr[z2 = 1|y = 1] + P0 · Pr[z1 = 1|y = 0] Pr[z2 = 1|y = 0]
≈ P1(1 − e1,z )2 + P0e20,z . (6)
In practice, we won’t obtain two identically distributed copies of answers for the same question
with the same e1,z , e0,z . However when the number of agent is large enough, we will show that
drawing two or three agents randomly from the population (without replacement) can approximate
these e1,z , e0,z with small and diminishing errors (as a function of number of agents N ). This can
factor into the errors in estimating q2,−i .
(3)Matching among three signals: The third equation is obtained by going one order higher
that, we check the matching-on-1 probability over three signals drawn randomly from (three)
reference agents. Similarly as defined for Eqn. (6) matching between two signals, draw three
independent signals (for the same task) from the reference agents, denote them as z1, z2, z3. Denote
the matching-on-1 probability of the three signals as Pr[z1 = z2 = z3 = 1] := q3,−i . Then we also
have that (details omitted)
q3,−i ≈ P1(1 − e1,z )3 + P0e30,z . (7)
Theorem 5.1. (e0,z , e1,z ) is the unique pair of solution to Eqn.(5, 6, 7), when P0 , P1.
This result implies that without ground truth data, knowing how frequently human agents reach
consensus with each other will help us characterize their (average) subjective biases. Furthermore,
releasing P0 to be another unknown variable, we prove that we do not need to know the exact
priors to really solve the equations:
Theorem 5.2. (P0, e0,z , e1,z ) are uniquely identified using the three matching equations when we
know the signal 1(P0 > 0.5).
Remark 1. We’d like to argue that at least one bit of information is needed in order to distinguish the
case when agents are truthfully reporting from the case that agents are misreporting by reverting their
observations. This is because for every possible tuple (P0, e0,z , e1,z ) resulted by truthful reporting from
agents, consider the following counterfactual world: relabeing 0→ 1 and 1→ 0, we will have another
distribution of observations characterized by the tuple (1−P0, e1,z , e0,z ). Then agents misreporting will
lead to a distribution with parameters being the same as (P0, e0,z , e1,z ). Thus the mechanism designer
cannot tell the above two cases apart.
Further we show that the three equations are not only necessary but also sufficient:
Theorem 5.3. The higher order (≥ 4) matching equations do not bring in additional information.
5.2 Statistical consistency results
All three parameters P1,−i ,q2,−i ,q3,−i can be estimated from agents’ reports, without the need of
knowing any ground truth labels. To enable the estimation, our method relies on multiple tasks
(therefore our mechanism is naturally a multi-task one). Among all assigned tasks, suppose there
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are K tasks that have been assigned to agents j , i - this is not hard to guarantee ∀i when we
assign more than K tasks to the entire set of agents randomly.
The algorithm first estimates the following three quantities for each agent i: q˜2,−i , q˜3,−i and
P˜ i1,−i based on above information. Denote the three agents that are assigned task k = 1, ...,K as
r1(k), r2(k), r3(k) , i , and their reports for task k as y˜ridx(k)(k), idx = 1, 2, 3. Then we estimate:
P˜1,−i =
∑K
k=1 1(y˜r1(k )(k) = 1)
K
, q˜2,−i =
∑K
k=1 1(y˜r1(k)(k) = y˜r2(k )(k) = 1)
K
,
q˜3,−i =
∑K
k=1 1(y˜r1(k )(k) = y˜r2(k )(k) = y˜r3(k )(k) = 1)
K
.
We can then solve the system of equations (5, 6, 7) with these estimates to obtain estimated error
rates e˜1,z , e˜0,z . We present the algorithm and a set of statistical consistency analysis for the case
when we know P0. The ones for the case with unknown P0 are similar but messier.
When P0 is known, e˜1,z , e˜0,z can be written as functions of q˜2,−i , q˜3,−i and P˜ i1,−i in closed-form:8
Mechanism 1 Learning of e1,z , e0,z
1. Estimate q˜2,−i , q˜3,−i and P˜1,−i .
2. Compute the following (solutions to Eqn.(5, 6, 7), details in Appendix):
e˜0,z : =
1
P1 − P0
(
q˜3,−i − q˜2,−i P˜1,−i
q˜2,−i − (P˜1,−i )2
· P1 − P˜1,−i
)
, (8)
e˜1,z : = 1 − 1P1 − P0
(
P˜1,−i − q˜3,−i − q˜2,−i P˜1,−i
q˜2,−i − (P˜1,−i )2
· P0
)
, (9)
We bound the estimation error in estimating reports’ error rate as a function ofK and N . The first
source of errors is the imperfect estimations of q2,−i ,q3,−i , P1,−i . The second is due to estimation
errors for matching probability with heterogeneous agents. Formally we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5.4. The mechanism designer can learn noisy copies of e1,z , e0,z ,φ(·) for each agent i
using data collected from agents j , i , denoting as e˜1,z , e˜0,z , φ˜, s.t. they satisfy (1) |e˜1,z − e1,z | ≤
ϵ, |e˜0,z − e0,z | ≤ ϵ with probability at least 1 − δ . (2) For the scoring function φ˜(·) defined using
e˜1,z , e˜0,z and φ(·) using e1,z , e0,z , we have with probability at least 1 − δ1 that |φ˜(t ,y) − φ(t ,y)| ≤ ϵ1,
∀t ,y. This further implies that |E[φ˜(t , z)] − E[φ(t , z)]| ≤ ϵ1 and thus |E[φ˜(t , z)] − E[S(t ,y)]| ≤ ϵ1.
All terms ϵ = O
(
N −1 +
√
K−1 · logK ),δ = O(K−1), ϵ1 = O (N −1 +√K−1 · logK ),δ1 = O(K−1) can be
made arbitrarily small with increasing K and N .
5.3 Information quantification and truth-telling is a dominant strategy
We define uniform dominant truth serum (DTS) as follows:
8The closed-form solutions when P0 is unknown can be found in Appendix.
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Mechanism 2 Uniform Dominant Truth Serum (DTS)
1. For each task agent i received and reported information, randomly select one of the rest two
reference reports (recall each task is randomly assigned to three agents) as the reference z.
2. When z is uninformative that e˜1,z + e˜0,z = 1:
- Score agent i zero regardless of his report.
3. When z is informative that e˜1,z + e˜0,z , 1:
- Score agent i via (SSR_alpha) defined using z, e˜1,z , e˜0,z .
When agents collude to report uninformative information, for example say a1 ≡ a2 ≡ ....aN = 1
for all assigned tasks, the three matching equations simply become:P1e1,z+P0(1−e0,z ) = 1, P1e21,z+
P0(1 − e0,z )2 = 1, P1e31,z + P0(1 − e0,z )3 = 1. It is easy to verify that the solution to above set of
equations is simply e1,z = 0, e0,z = 1⇒ e1,z + e0,z = 1, i.e., we can detect this uninformative case.
Theorem 5.4 readily implies that DTS is asymptotically (in K ,N ) preserving the information
quantification as strictly proper scoring rules do and induces a dominant strategy for agent to
report truthfully, when z is informative (proper otherwise). To see this, suppose both e˜1,z , e˜0,z have
converged to their true values, we have E[φ˜(ai (n;σi ), z)] → E[S(ai (n;σi ),y)]. Formally,
Theorem 5.5. When z is informative, asymptotically the expected score of DTS equals to the score of
its corresponding strictly proper scoring rule S , and it is a strictly multi-task dominant strategy for agent
i to report truthfully. DTS induces a (weakly)-multi-task dominant strategy when z is uninformative.
Remark 2. Several remarks follow. (1) We would like to emphasize again that both z and φ come
from D−i : z will be decided by agents j , i’s reports D−i . φ not only has z as input, but its definition
also depends on e1,z and e0,z , which will be learned fromD−i . (2) When making decisions on reporting,
we show under our mechanisms agents can choose to be oblivious of how much error presents in
others’ reports. This removes the practical concern of implementing a particular Nash Equilibrium.
(3) Another salient feature of our mechanism is that we have migrated the cognitive load for having
prior knowledge from agents to the mechanism designer. Yet we do not assume the designer has direct
knowledge neither; instead we will leverage the power of estimation from reported data to achieve our
goal.
Now we show the results in finite sample regime under noisy estimations. We first define the
informative region. When e0,z + e1,z is arbitrarily close to 1, we have the difficulty in determining
the number of samples needed for the learning process (to decide whether z is informative or not).
With this in mind, we will modify our mechanism as follows: when |e˜1,z + e˜0,z − 1| ≤ κ (instead of
setting it to be exactly 0) for some small positive constant κ, score agent i nothing, i.e., z is treated
as being uninformative. κ can then help us quantify the number of K ,N needed.
Theorem 5.6. When z is informative, set κ small enough and K ,N large enough but finite, DTS
returns a score that is ϵ(K ,N ) close to the score of its corresponding strictly proper scoring rules,
where ϵ(K ,N ) = O (N −1 +√K−1 logK ) is a diminishing term in both K and N . Further with DTS, for
each agent i , (1) for signal elicitation, it is a strictly multi-task dominant strategy to report si (n),∀n
truthfully. (2) For prediction elicitation, it is a strictly multi-task dominant strategy to report pi (n),∀n
truthfully when S(·) is strictly concave in report ai (n;σi ) and Lipschitz. (3) For prediction elicitation,
it is an ϵ(K ,N )-approximately strictly multi-task dominant strategy to report pi truthfully for any
Lipschitz S(·).
Above we adopt the approximately multi-task dominant strategy definition as follows: truth-
telling is ϵ-multi-task dominant strategy if E[φ(Ii (n), z)] ≥ E[φ(ai (n;σi ), z)] − ϵ, ∀ai (n;σi ) , Ii (n).
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Datasets Study 1a Study 1b Study 1c Study 2 Study 3 Study 4a Study 4b
(e1,z, e0,z ) (.53, .23) (.45, .22) (.49, .15) (.49, .45) (.29, .43) (.26, .67) (.13, .61)
(e˜1,z, e˜0,z ) (.51, .19) (.45, .22) (.47, .11) (.35, .31) (.13, .29) (.23, .59) (.13, .57)
MSE Study 1a Study 1b Study 1c Study 2 Study 3 Study 4a Study 4b
1/Prior: DTS .04 ± .01 .09 ± .03 .04 ± .02 .04 ± .02 .06 ± .03 .05 ± .03 .02 ± .01
1/Prior: PTS .10 ± .04 .18 ± .09 .21 ± .10 .04 ± .02 .11 ± .04 .03 ± .02 .11 ± .06
1/Prior: BTS .33 ± .11 .28 ± .15 .40 ± .16 .15 ± .04 2.00 ± .64 .19 ± .11 1.17 ± .41
Brier: DTS .002 ± .001 .004 ± .002 .006 ± .002 .008 ± .005 .02 ± .005 .004 ± .003 .005 ± .003
Table 1. Top: true (e1,z , e0,z ) computed using ground truth v.s. estimated (e˜1,z , e˜0,z ). Bottom:MSE of estim-
ated scores w.r.t. the true scores. Though PTS scores have low error rates for some dataset, they don’t reflect
the order of participants’ true performance (see our full version for a complete set of figures.)
6 EXPERIMENTS
Since we have made assumption on the homogeneous error rates across tasks for agents in proving
the theoretical properties of DTS, we validate DTS using several datasets collected from human
subjects.
6.1 Human judgement datasets
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(c) PTS v.s. True Score: 1/Prior
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Fig. 1. Experiment results on Study 4b: 20 participants on 90 questions.
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These datasets were collected and first reported in [36]. There are four types of questions: (i)
Study 1a,b,c: capital city in United States. (ii) Study 2: general knowledge questions. (iii) Study 3:
skin lesion identification. (iv) Study 4a,b: art piece price. These datasets are a mixture of both lab and
online experiments (e.g. done on Amazon Mechanical Turk). For each dataset, human participants
report binary answers to each of the questions, such as “Is this art work’s price higher than $30k?
(y/n)". For several datasets, participants also report confidences (a continuous number in [0, 1]) in
their answers. For evaluation purposes, we will convert this number into a probabilistic prediction.9
For readers who are interested in the full details of these datasets, please refer to [36]. We summarize
some basics in our full version draft. 1/Prior score is used to evaluate participants’ binary answers
and we use Brier scoring rule to evaluate probabilistic predictions. For each participant, we compute
their true performance scores for each task they performed using ground truth answers and take
an average. Then we compute the “surrogate" performance scores for each participant using DTS
(without accessing the ground truth). To support our theory, we expect to see that the surrogate
scores approximate the true scores, and reflect the differences in participants’ true performances.
In Fig. 1, participants are ordered by their true performance scores (in decreasing order). We do
observe that the surrogate scores (plotted next to the true scores) approximate the true scores well,
while the scores returned by peer prediction scores (Peer Truth Serum (PTS) [16] and Bayesian
Truth Serum (BTS) [36] 10) generally do not reflect participants’ differences in true performance
scores (see Fig. 1c). More results on other datasets can be found in our full version.
Detailed empirical results are summarized in Table 1. Our error rate estimation algorithm works
reasonably well for Studies 1, 2, and 4. Note this is done without assuming the knowledge of
marginal priors P0,P1. The average errors (averaged across all participants) in approximating Brier
scores are smaller as the scores are continuous, as compared to the 1/Prior scores. We highlighted
in Study 4 that participants are more likely to be wrong (e0,z > 0.5) for a certain label class; yet our
estimation procedure was able to identify the high error rate.
6.2 Human forecasting dataset
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Fig. 2. DTS scores v.s. true scores (Brier
scores): Human forecasting
We also carried out studies over a set of large scale human
forecast data collected from a forecasting competition. In
this dataset, we have in total > 1000 participants contributed
predictions for over 100 geo-political events in a time span of
6 months. For instance, the participants were asked questions
such as “Will event X happen before August 1st, 2018?” 11
Each participant will give their prediction p ∈ [0, 1] for the
event they chose to forecast on.
For each participant, we compute their true Brier scores
(B.S.) for each task (denoting as IFPs) they predicted using
the ground truth answers. We then average them across
events. We further compute the DTS scores for each par-
ticipant without accessing the ground truth). In Fig. 2, We
observe that the DTS scores approximate the true scores (i.e,
the dots plot approximately aligns with the line of y = x),
and reflect the differences in participants’ true performances.
9When this number is missing, we use another prediction from agent to make such a conversion. For our evaluation purpose,
it doesn’t really matter how this number is generated.
10The comparison with BTS may not be completely fair as the scores are looking to be on different scales. But the BTS
scores generally don’t rank participants similarly as the rank according to the true scores.
11Due to double blind submission, we cannot reveal more information about this dataset at this moment.
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7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We propose SSR and DTS to quantify the value of elicited information in IEWV settings, as strictly
proper scoring rules do for the with verification setting, which complement the literature of strictly
proper scoring rules by considering the setting when there is only access to a noisy copy of the
ground truth. Our findings are both verified analytically and empirically.
Our work opens up the study of calibrating the value of information for the peer prediction setting.
In the future, we hope to complement the current works via studying the cases with correlated
signals, heterogeneous error rates, and machine learning aided reference report generation.
APPENDIX
We fill in the main missing proofs.
A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.4
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose there exists a score function S(ai , zi ) that takes
each agent’s report ai and a reference answer zi as inputs. zi is potentially a function of reports
collected from all the agents. Consider two agents i, j who have observed different signals, suppose
si = 1, si = 0. Denote by a−i the set of reports from agents except for i . In the non-uniform dominant
strategy argument, consider the case that a−i = a−j , i.e., the reports are the same from N \{i} and
N \{j} according to certain reporting strategies. As truthful reporting is a dominant strategy, we
have
S(ai = 1, zi = {ai = 1,a−i }) > S(ai = 0, zi = {ai = 0,a−i }) (10)
S(aj = 0, zi = {aj = 0,a−i }) > S(aj = 1, zi = {aj = 1,a−j }) (11)
From above we know the following is true
S(ai = 1, zi = {ai = 1,a−i }) > S(ai = 0, zi = {ai = 0,a−i }) = S(aj = 0, zj = {aj = 0,a−j })
> S(aj = 1, zi = {aj = 1,a−j }) = S(ai = 1, zi = {ai = 1,a−i }) (12)
The inequalities are due to the dominant strategy assumption in truthful reporting. The first equality
is due to a−i = a−j , and the second is simply changing the notation of the variables (since they
have the same value). Contradiction. □
B PROOF OF THEOREM 4.4
Proof. Consider agent i , and the case that e1,z + e0,z < 1. The proof is straightforward following
the “unbiasedness” property established for φ(·) in Lemma 4.3:
E[φ(ai , z)] = E
[
E[φ(ai , z)|y]
]
= E[S(ai ,y)].
The theorem follows immediately from the strictly properness of S . Now consider the case with
e1,z+e0,z > 1. We cannot directly apply Lemma 4.3. Now let’s define the “flip signal” zˆ of z: zˆ = 1−z.
Easy to see that
e1, zˆ := Pr[zˆ = 0|y = 1] = Pr[z = 1|y = 1] = 1 − e1,z , (13)
e0, zˆ := Pr[zˆ = 1|y = 0] = Pr[z = 0|y = 0] = 1 − e0,z , (14)
15
and e1, zˆ + e0, zˆ < 1. The scoring function for agent i then becomes:
φ(ai , z = o) = (1 − e1−o,z ) · S(ai ,o) − eo,z · S(ai , 1 − o)1 − e1,z − e0,z .
=
[1 − (1 − eo,z )]S(ai , 1 − o) − (1 − e1−o,z )S(ai ,o)
1 − (1 − e1,z ) − (1 − e0,z )
=
(1 − e1−(1−o), zˆ )S(ai , 1 − o) − e1−o, zˆS(ai ,o)
1 − e1, zˆ − e0, zˆ
= φ(ai , zˆ = 1 − o). (15)
Then we have
E[φ(ai , z)] = E[φ(ai , zˆ)] = E
[
E[φ(ai , zˆ)|y]
]
= E[S(ai ,y)],
where the last equality is due to the unbiasedness of φ(·) with respect to zˆ (instead of z), and the
fact that e1, zˆ + e0, zˆ < 1, so Lemma 4.3 can be applied. Again it is easy to see it would be agent i’s
best interest to tell the truth, due to the strict properness or truthfulness of S(·). □
C PROOF OF THEOREM 4.5
Proof. First according to Theorem 4.4 we have
Ez [φ(ai , z)] = Ey [S(ai ,y)] = P1S(ai , 1) + P0S(ai , 0).
When y = 1,
Ez |y=1
[
φ(ai , z) − Ez [φ(ai , z)]
]2
= e1,z
( (1 − e1,z )S(ai , 0) − e0,zS(ai , 1)
1 − e1,z − e0,z − (P1S(ai , 1) + P0S(ai , 0))
)
+(1 − e1)
( (1 − e0,z )S(ai , 1) − e1,zS(ai , 0)
1 − e1,z − e0,z − (P1S(ai , 1) + P0S(ai , 0))
)
=e1,z
(S(ai , 1) − S(ai , 0))2(P1(1 − e1,z − e0,z ) + e0,z )2
(1 − e1,z − e0,z )
+(1 − e1,z ) (S(ai , 1) − S(ai , 0))
2(P0(1 − e1,z − e0,z ) + e1,z )2
(1 − e1,z − e0,z ) .
To summarize
Ez |y=1
[
φ(ai , z) − Ez [φ(ai , z)]
]2
=
(S(ai , 1) − S(ai , 0))2Ez |y=1
[P1−z (1 − e1,z − e0,z ) + ez,z ]2
(1 − e1,z − e0,z )
Similarly we derive Ez |y=0
[
φ(ai , z) − Ez [φ(ai , z)]
]2, and we complete the proof. □
D PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1 (SKETCH)
Proof. First of all, there are at most two solutions from Eqn. (5) and (6), since the equations are
at most order two. Further we prove the following properties of its solutions:
Lemma D.1. For the solutions to Eqn.(5) and (6), we have
(1) when the reports are uninformative such that e0,z + e1,z = 1, the above equation returns exactly
one solution satisfying that e0,z + e1,z = 1.
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(2) When the reports are informative such that e0,z +e1,z , 1, Eqn.(5) and (7) jointly return two pairs
of solutions [e0,z (1), e1,z (1)], [e0,z (2), e1,z (2)]. and exactly one of them satisfies e0,z (1)+e1,z (1) <
1 and the other one that e0,z (2) + e1,z (2) > 1. Further the summations of the two pairs have the
same distance to the 1 (uninformative): 1 − (e0,z (1) + e1,z (1)) = (e0,z (2) + e1,z (2)) − 1.
The proof can be found in our extended version of this draft. We shall shorthand the following:
x1 := e0,z , x2 := 1 − e1,z . We now show the following fact:
Eqn.(7) − Eqn.(5) · Eqn.(6)⇔ P0x31 + P1x32 − (P0x1 + P1x2)(P0x21 + P1x22) = q3,i − q2,iP1
⇔P0P1(x31 + x32 − x21x2 − x1x22) = q3,−i − q2,−iP1,−i
⇔P0P1(x1 − x2)2(x1 + x2) = q3,−i − q2,−iP1,−i
⇔x1 + x2 = (q3,−i − q2,−iP1,−i )P0
∆2P1
The above equation, together with equation (I), will uniquely identify the solution for x1,x2 when
P0 , P1:
x1 =
1
P1 − P0
(
q3,−i − q2,−iP1,−i
q2,−i − P21,−i
P1 − P1,−i
)
, x2 =
1
P1 − P0
(
P1,−i − q3,−i − q2,−iP1,−i
q2,−i − P21,−i
P0
)
.
This completes the proof. □
The case with unknown P0 can be similarly argued with a finer-degree analysis. We leave the
details into our full version of this draft, while we only write out the solutions: Let’s simplify the
three matching equations in notation: Let c1, c2, c3 denote the first, second and third order matching
statistics, x := 1 − e0,z ,y := e1,z , z := P0:
z · x + (1 − z) · y = c1 (16)
z · x2 + (1 − z) · y2 = c2 (17)
z · x3 + (1 − z) · y3 = c3 (18)
Define a := c3−c1c2c2−c21 , b :=
c1c3−c22
c2−c21
. Then x = a±
√
a2−4b
2 ,y =
a∓√a2−4b
2 , z =
c1−y
x−y . Denote the two pairs
of solutions as (x1,y1) and (x2,y2). By symmetry we know x1 = y2, y1 = x2. Further we have
x1 , y1 and x2 , y2, due to the fact again that e0,z + e1,z , 1. Since c1 = z · x + (1− z) ·y, and z > 0,
then it must be min{x ,y} < c1 < max{x ,y}. Suppose x1 < y1, then x2 > y2. If |y1 − c1 | > |c1 − x1 |,
then z > 0.5; otherwise if |y1 − c1 | < |c1 − x1 |, z < 0.5, or if |y1 − c1 | = |c1 − x1 |, we will know that
z = 0.5, contradicts the non-uniform prior assumption.
E PROOF OF THEOREM 5.4 (SKETCH)
Proof. Estimation error due to heterogeneous agents: The first challenge lies in the fact that the
higher order equations doesn’t capture the true matching probability with heterogeneous workers.
If we assign one task (to be labeled) to two different workers, due to the asymmetric error rate,
the LHS of Eqn. (I) is not precise– drawing a worker without replacement leads to a different
labeling accuracy, and will complicate the solution for the system of equations. We show that our
estimation, though being ignoring above bias, will not affect our results by too much: denoting by e1
the accuracy of first drawn sample (for checking the matching) when y = 1 (we can similarly argue
for y = 0). Then we have E[e1] = e1,z . And the average accuracy of the second drawn sample e2
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(conditional on e1) is given by e1,z (N−1)−e1N−2 . Further the matching probability satisfies the following:
E[e1 · e2] = E
[
E[e1 · e2 |e1]
]
= E
[
e1 · e1,z (N − 1) − e1
N − 2
]
=E[e1] · e1,z (N − 1)
N − 2 −
E[e21]
N − 2 =
N − 1
N − 2e
2
1,z −
E[e21]
N − 2
Note both e1,z and E[e21] are no more than 1. Then
|N − 1
N − 2e1,z −
E[e21]
N − 2 − e
2
1,z | ≤
|e21,z |
N − 2 +
E[e21]
N − 2 ≤
2
N − 2 .
That the estimated quantity is bounded away from the true parameter by at mostO(1/N ). Similarly
|E[e1 · e2 · e3] − e31,z | ≤ 3N−3 .
Estimation errors due to finite estimation samples: The second sources of errors come from the
estimation errors of q˜2,−i , q˜3,−i and P˜1,−i . We have the following lemma:
Lemma E.1. When there are K samples for estimating q˜2,−i , q˜3,−i and P˜1,−i respectively (total
budgeting 3K) and K ≥ log 6/δ2ϵ 2 for any ϵ,δ > 0, we have with probability at least 1 − δ
|q˜2,−i − q2,−i | ≤ ϵ + 2
N − 2 , |q˜3,−i − q3,−i | ≤ ϵ +
3
N − 3 , |P˜1,−i − P1,−i | ≤ ϵ .
The above lemma can be easily established using Chernoff bound, and our arguments in estimat-
ing with heterogeneous agents above. We now bound the error in estimating p0,z ,p1,z , under the
(ϵ,δ )-event proved in Lemma F.1:
|e˜0,z − e0,z | ≤ 1P1 − P0
[
2P1
ϵ + 2N−2 +
3
N−3
κ2P20P21
+ 2P1
ϵ + 2N−2
(κ2P20P21 )2
+ ϵ
]
.
|e˜1,z − e1,z | ≤ 1P1 − P0
[
2P0
ϵ + 2N−2 +
3
N−3
κ2P20P21
+ 2P0
ϵ + 2N−2
(κ2P20P21 )2
+ ϵ
]
.
Summarizing and set δ = O( 1K ) we have ϵ = O
( 1
N +
√
logK
K
)
. With the error rates bounds for
e0,z , e1,z , from Lemma 5.4 [33], which we reproduce in our contexts as follows:
Lemma E.2. When K ,N are large enough s.t. ϵ ≤ (1− e0,z − e1,z )/4 := ∆e , with probability at least
1 − 2δ , |φ˜(t ,y) − φ(t ,y)| ≤ 1+∆e2∆2e · ϵ .
The above gives us a bound on the error of estimating φ(·). This estimation error can be further
mapped to the errors in computing the surrogate scoring functions for each agent. When the error
becomes sufficiently small, we will be able to establish the incentive property. □
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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
We fill in the missing proofs and figures, as well as solutions for the case when we have correlated
signals.
A PROOF OF THEOREM 2.3
Proof.
Ey∼p∗
[
1(s = y)
Pr[y = s]
]
= (1 − p∗) · Pr[s = 0|y = 0]Pr[y = 0] + p
∗ · Pr[s = 1|y = 1]Pr[y = 1]
=
1 − p∗
Pr[y = 0] · Pr[s = 0|y = 0] +
p∗
Pr[y = 1] · Pr[s = 1|y = 1]
=
1 − p∗
Pr[y = 0] · (1 − e0,s ) +
p∗
Pr[y = 1] (1 − e1,s )
=
1 − p∗
Pr[y = 0] +
p∗
Pr[y = 1] −
( 1 − p∗
Pr[y = 0] · e0,s +
p∗
Pr[y = 1] · e1,s
)
,
completing the proof. □
B PROOF OF LEMMA 3.2
Proof. We will not carry the index k for si (k). Suppose not we will have
Pr[y = 0|si = 0] = Pr[y = 0|si = 1], (19)
Pr[y = 1|si = 0] = Pr[y = 1|si = 1]. (20)
From Eqn. (19) we know that
Pr[y = 0, si = 1]
Pr[si = 1] =
Pr[y = 0, si = 0]
Pr[si = 0]
⇔Pr[y = 0]p0,iPr[si = 1] =
Pr[y = 0](1 − e0,i )
Pr[si = 0] ,
when Pr[y = 0] , 0 we know that Pr[si=1]Pr[si=0] =
e0,i
1−e0,i . Similarly from Eqn. (20) we know
Pr[si=1]
Pr[si=0] =
1−e1,i
e1,i
. Therefore we know e0,i1−e0,i =
1−e1,i
e1,i
, from which we have e0,i + e1,i = 1. Contradiction. □
C PROOF OF LEMMA D.1
Proof. Eqn.(5) and (6) become equivalent with the following
(I) : P0x1 + P1x2 = P1,−i , (II) : P0x21 + P1x22 = q2,−i .
From the first equation (I) we know that x1 = P1,−i−P1 ·x2P0 . Then
x1 − x2 = P1,−i − P1 · x2P0 − x2 =
P1,−i − x2
P0
Further plug x1 into the second equation (II) we have
P1x22 − 2P1P1,−ix2 + P21,−i − P0q2,−i = 1⇒ x2 = P1,−i ± ∆,
where ∆ :=
√
(2P1P1,−i )2 − 4P1(P21,−i − P0q2,−i )
2P1 .
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From above we have derived the following
e0,z + e1,z − 1 = x1 − x2 = ± ∆P0 .
When e0,z + e1,z = 1, we know we must have ∆ = 0 so we land at a unique solution. When
e0,z + e1,z , 1, we know that ∆ > 0 and we have two solutions – but both solutions satisfy that
|e0,z + e1,z − 1| = ∆P0 ,
finishing the proof. □
D PROOF OF THEOREM 5.2
Proof. Let’s simplify the three matching equations in notation:
P0(1 − e0,z ) + P1e1,z = c1 (21)
P0(1 − e0,z )2 + P1e21,z = c2 (22)
P0(1 − e0,z )3 + P1e31,z = c3, (23)
where c1, c2, c3 denote the first, second and third order matching statistics. Further denote by
x := 1 − e0,z ,y := e1,z , z := P0:
z · x + (1 − z) · y = c1 (24)
z · x2 + (1 − z) · y2 = c2 (25)
z · x3 + (1 − z) · y3 = c3 (26)
From Eqn.(24) we know z(x − y) = c1 − y (∗). From Eqn.(25) and (26) we have respectively that
z(x − y)(x + y) + y2 = c2
z(x − y)(x2 + xy + y2) + y3 = c3
Plug Eqn.(∗) into above two equations we know:
(c1 − y) · (x + y) + y2 = c2 ⇒ c1(x + y) − xy = c2 (27)
(c1 − y)(x2 + xy + y2) + y3 = c3
⇒c1(x2 + xy + y2) − xy(x + y) = c3
⇒c1((x + y)2 − xy) − xy(x + y) = c3 (28)
Denote x + y = a, xy = b, then a = b+c2c1 from Eqn. (27). Note the above is well defined, as o.w. if
c1 = 0, we have to have x = y = 0 which leads to e0,z + e1,z = 1, which is a contradiction. Substitute
(a,b) into Eqn. (28) we have
c1 ·
( (b + c2)2
c21
− b) − b · b + c2
c1
= c3 (29)
⇒(b + c2)
2
c1
− b · c1 − b
2
c1
− ·c2
c1
= c3 (30)
⇒(c2
c1
− c1
)
b = c3 −
c22
c1
⇒ b = c1c3 − c
2
2
c2 − c21
(31)
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Further a = b+c2c1 =
c3−c1c2
c2−c21
. Now we show that c2 , c21 , so the above pair of solutions are well
defined. Suppose not, we will have
(z · x + (1 − z) · y)2 = z · x2 + (1 − z) · y2 (32)
⇒2 · z(1 − z) · xy = z(1 − z)x2 + z(1 − z)y2 (33)
⇒2xy = x2 + y2 ⇒ (x − y)2 = 0 (34)
which contradicts that e0,z + e1,z , 1. Then from x + y = a, xy = b, there exists at most two
solutions (x = a±
√
a2−4b
2 ,y =
a∓√a2−4b
2 ). Denote them as (x1,y1) and (x2,y2). By symmetry we know
x1 = y2, y1 = x2. Further we have x1 , y1 and x2 , y2, due to the fact again that e0,z + e1,z , 1.
Since c1 = z ·x + (1−z) ·y, and z > 0, then it must bemin{x ,y} < c1 < max{x ,y}. Suppose x1 < y1,
then x2 > y2. If |y1 − c1 | > |c1 − x1 |, then z > 0.5; otherwise if |y1 − c1 | < |c1 − x1 |, z < 0.5, or if
|y1 − c1 | = |c1 − x1 |, we will know that z = 0.5, contradicts the non-uniform prior assumption.
□
E PROOF OF THEOREM 5.3
Proof. We follow the shorthand notations as in the proof of Theorem 5.2 (Section D). Consider
the fourth equation:
zx4 + (1 − z)y4 =(zx3 + (1 − z)y3)(x + y) − xy(zx2 + (1 − z)y2). (35)
zx3 + (1− z)y3 and zx2 + (1− z)y2 are the second and third equation, while we know the first three
equations already uniquely characterize x + y and xy, so the fourth equation is redundant. This
sets up the induction basis. For any n > 5, we have
zxn + (1 − z)yn = (zxn−1 + (1 − z)yn−1)(x + y) − xy(zxn−2 + (1 − z)yn−2). (36)
By induction hypothesis we know zxn−1 + (1 − z)yn−1 and zxn−2 + (1 − z)yn−2 can both be written
as functions of the first three equations, so is zxn + (1 − z)yn . Proved. □
F PROOF OF THEOREM 5.4
Proof. Estimation error due to heterogeneous agents: The first challenge lies in the fact that the
higher order equations doesn’t capture the true matching probability with heterogeneous workers.
If we assign one task (to be labeled) to two different workers, due to the asymmetric error rate,
the LHS of Eqn. (I) is not precise– drawing a worker without replacement leads to a different
labeling accuracy, and will complicate the solution for the system of equations. We show that our
estimation, though being ignoring above bias, will not affect our results by too much: denoting by e1
the accuracy of first drawn sample (for checking the matching) when y = 1 (we can similarly argue
for y = 0). Then we have E[e1] = e1,z . And the average accuracy of the second drawn sample e2
(conditional on e1) is given by e1,z (N−1)−e1N−2 . Further the matching probability satisfies the following:
E[e1 · e2] = E
[
E[e1 · e2 |e1]
]
=E
[
e1 · e1,z (N − 1) − e1
N − 2
]
=E[e1] · e1,z (N − 1)
N − 2 −
E[e21]
N − 2
=
N − 1
N − 2e
2
1,z −
E[e21]
N − 2
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Note both e1,z and E[e21] are no more than 1. ThenN − 1
N − 2e1,z −
E[e21]
N − 2 − e
2
1,z
 ≤ |e21,z |
N − 2 +
E[e21]
N − 2 ≤
2
N − 2 .
That the estimated quantity is bounded away from the true parameter by at most Θ(1/N ). Similarly
for the third order equation we haveE[e1 · e2 · e3] − e31,z  ≤ 3N − 3 .
Estimation errors due to finite estimation samples: The second sources of errors come from the
estimation errors of q˜2,−i , q˜3,−i and P˜1,−i . We have the following lemma:
Lemma F.1. When there are K samples for estimating q˜2,−i , q˜3,−i and P˜1,−i respectively (total
budgeting 3K) and K ≥ log 6/δ2ϵ 2 for any ϵ,δ > 0, we have with probability at least 1 − δ
|q˜2,−i − q2,−i | ≤ ϵ + 2
N − 2 , |q˜3,−i − q3,−i | ≤ ϵ +
3
N − 3 , |P˜1,−i − P1,−i | ≤ ϵ .
The above lemma can be easily established using Chernoff bound, and our arguments in estimat-
ing with heterogeneous agents above. We now bound the error in estimating p0,z ,p1,z , under the
(ϵ,δ )-event proved in Lemma F.1. First of all
|e˜0,z − e0,z |
=
 1
P1 − P0
(
q˜3,−i − q˜2,−i P˜1,−i
q˜2,−i − (P˜1,−i )2
P1 − P˜1,−i
)
− 1P1 − P0
(
q3,−i − q2,−iP1
q2,−i − P21
P1 − P1,−i
)
≤ 1P1 − P0
( q˜3,−i − q˜2,−i P˜1,−i
q˜2,−i − (P˜1,−i )2
− q3,−i − q2,−iP1
q2,−i − P21
P1 + P˜1,−i − P1,−i ) .
According to Lemma 7 of [37], which we reproduce as follows:
Lemma F.2. For k ≥ 1 and two sequences {li }mi=1 and {qi }mi=1 and 0 ≤ li ,qi ≤ 1,∀i = 1, ...,k ., we
have  m∏
i=1
li −
m∏
j=1
qj
 ≤ m∑
i=1
|li − qi | . (37)
We know the following facts
|q˜2,−i − (P˜1,−i )2) − (q2,−i − P21,−i )|
≤|(P˜1,−i )2 − P21,−i | + |q˜2,−i − q2,−i |
≤3ϵ + 2
N − 2 ,
|(q˜3,−i − q˜2,−i P˜1,−i ) − (q3,−i − q2,−iP1,−i )|
≤|q˜3,−i − q3,−i | + |q˜2,−i P˜1,−i − q2,−iP1,−i |
≤3ϵ + 2
N − 2 +
3
N − 3 .
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First we prove that
q2,−i − P21,−i
=P0x21 + P1x22 − (P0x1 + P1x2)2
=P0P1(x1 − x2)2
≥P0P1κ2.
Let 3ϵ + 2N−2 ≤ P0P1κ2/2, we know that (using mean-value theorem/inequality) q˜3,−i − q˜2,−i P˜1,−i
q˜2,−i − (P˜1,−i )2
− q3,−i − q2,−iP1,−i
q2,−i − P21

≤  q˜3,−i − q˜2,−i P˜1,−i
q˜2,−i − (P˜1,−i )2
− q3,−i − q2,−iP1,−i
q˜2,−i − (P˜1,−i )2

+
q3,−i − q2,−iP1,−i
q˜2,−i − (P˜1,−i )2
− q3,−i − q2,−iP1,−i
q2,−i − P21,−i

≤ 2ϵ +
2
N−2 +
3
N−3
κ2P20P21
+ 2
ϵ + 2N−2
(κ2P20P21 )2
.
Together we proved that
|e˜0,z − e0,z | ≤ 1P1 − P0
[
2P1
ϵ + 2N−2 +
3
N−3
κ2P20P21
+ 2P1
ϵ + 2N−2
(κ2P20P21 )2
+ ϵ
]
.
Similarly we are able to work out sensitivity analysis for e1,z that
|e˜1,z − e1,z | ≤ 1P1 − P0
[
2P0
ϵ + 2N−2 +
3
N−3
κ2P20P21
+ 2P0
ϵ + 2N−2
(κ2P20P21 )2
+ ϵ
]
.
Summarizing and set δ = O( 1K ) we have ϵ = O
( 1
N +
√
logK
K
)
. With the error rates bounds for
e0,z , e1,z , from Lemma 5.4 [33], which we reproduce in our contexts as follows:
Lemma F.3. When K ,N are large enough s.t. ϵ ≤ (1 − e0,z − e1,z )/4 := ∆e , with probability at least
1 − 2δ ,
|φ˜(t ,y) − φ(t ,y)| ≤ 1 + ∆e
2∆2e
· ϵ, ∀t ,y.
We then obtain a bound on estimating φ(·). □
G PROOF OF THEOREM 5.5
Proof. First for the case that e˜1,z + e˜0,z = 1, it is indifferent for agent i to truthfully report, or to
misreport, or to randomize between the two strategies. Thus truth-telling is a weakly dominant
strategy. When e˜1,z + e˜0,z , 1, the multi-task dominant strategy argument follows from the strictly
properness of (SSR_alpha). □
H PROOF OF THEOREM 5.6
Proof. The proof applies to all assigned tasks n = 1, ...,ni so we will drop the dependency on
index n. When it’s clear in the context, we will also drop ai ’s dependence on σi and simply write
the reported information as ai .
Suppose |e0,z + e1,z − 1| ≥ 2κ. Then when the estimation errors are small enough such that
|e˜0,z − e0,z | + |e˜1,z − e1,z | ≤ κ, we know that |e˜0,z + e˜1,z − 1| ≥ κ. Denote by ∆φ = E[S(si ,y)] −
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maxai,si E[S(ai ,y)], theminimumgap between the scores for truthfully reporting andmis-reporting.
We can easily show that ∆φ > 0 for signal elicitation case, as we can take ai to be the three basis of
mis-reporting: always reverting the observation, always reporting 1 and always reporting 0. Then
with a noisy estimation of φ(·), we have (using Theorem 5.4)E[φ˜(ai , z)] − E[φ(ai , z)] ≤ ϵ1 + δ1 ·max φ˜, ∀ai .E[φ˜(ai , z)] − E[S(ai ,y)] ≤ ϵ1 + δ1 ·max φ˜, ∀ai .
Above, we implicitly assumed the boundedness of φ˜(·): notice with bounded scoring function
S , indeed we know that max φ˜ ≤ 2max Sκ . Since E[φ(si , z)] = E[S(si ,y)], choose ϵ1,δ1 such that
ϵ1 + δ1 ·max φ˜ < ∆φ/2 we will have (for ai , si )
E[φ˜(si , z)] > E[S(si ,y)] − ∆φ/2 > E[S(ai ,y)] + ∆φ/2 > E[φ˜(ai , z)].
i.e., the strict properness will preserve, under the noisy estimations. From above results we also
observe that a larger ∆φ will allow more noisy estimations. We thus can trade more payment with
sample complexity, via designing the strictly proper scoring functions to increase ∆φ .
Now consider the prediction elicitation case. Suppose that S(p,y) is strictly concave w.r.t. p ∀y
with parameter λ. φ˜(ai ,y) = φ(ai ,y) + ϵ(ai ,y), where ϵ(ai ,y) indicates the error term.
E[φ˜(ai ,y)] − E[φ˜(a′i ,y)]
=
(
E[φ˜(ai ,y)] − E[φ(ai ,y)]
)−(E[φ˜(a′i ,y)] − E[φ(a′i ,y)]) + (E[φ(ai ,y)] − E[φ(a′i ,y)])
Noticing that using strictly concavity we have
E[φ(ai ,y)] − E[φ(a′i ,y)] = E[S(ai ,y)] − E[S(a′i ,y)] ≥ λ |ai − a′i |.
Further we notice that
ϵ(ai ,y) = φ˜(ai ,y) − φ(ai ,y)
=( 1 − e˜1−y,z1 − e˜1,z − e˜0,z −
1 − e1−y,z
1 − e1,z − e0,z )S(ai ,y)
− ( e˜y,z1 − e˜1,z − e˜0,z −
ey,z
1 − e1,z − e0,z )S(ai ,−y).
Due to the sample complexity results we know that with probability at least 1 − δ that 1 − e˜1−y,z
1 − e˜1,z − e˜0,z −
1 − e1−y,z
1 − e1,z − e0,z
 ≤ ϵ1, e˜y,z
1 − e˜1,z − e˜0,z −
ey,z
1 − e1,z − e0,z
 ≤ ϵ1,
where δ = O( 1K ) and ϵ1 = O
( 1
N +
√
logK
K
)
.
Suppose S(p,y) is also Lipschitz w.r.t. p ∀y with parameter L. By Lipschitz conditions we know
that with probability at least 1 − δ that ϵ(ai ,y) is Lipschitz with parameters 2ϵ1L by composition
property and
|ϵ(ai ,y) − ϵ(a′i ,y)| ≤ 2ϵ1L · |ai − a′i |.
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With probability at most δ that 1 − e˜1−y,z
1 − e˜1,z − e˜0,z −
1 − e1−y,z
1 − e1,z − e0,z
 ≤ 2
κ
, e˜y,z
1 − e˜1,z − e˜0,z −
ey,z
1 − e1,z − e0,z
 ≤ 2
κ
,
i.e., ϵ(ai ,y) is Lipschitz with parameters 2κ L by composition property and
|ϵ(ai ,y) − ϵ(a′i ,y)| ≤
2
κ
L · |ai − a′i |.
Combining we have
|E[ϵ(ai ,y)] − [ϵ(a′i ,y)]| ≤ 2ϵ1L · |ai − a′i | +
2δ
κ
L · |ai − a′i |.
Therefore when ϵ1,δ are small enough such that
2ϵ1L +
2δ
κ
L < λ,
no deviation is profitable.
The ϵ(K ,N ) = 2ϵ1L + 2δκ L = O
( 1
N +
√
logK
K +
1
K
)
-dominant strategy argument follows naturally
from above error term analysis. We will not repeat the details. □
I DISCUSSIONS
Below we make a couple of remarks, discuss possible caveats and their possible fix.
I.1 Weak dominance v.s. strong dominance
We have shown when we cannot learn an informative enough reference report from the rest of
the agents, there is very little we can do regarding that. With this note, our deterministic payment
strategy is only weakly dominant. We argue that if agents’ reports can be modeled as being from
certain distributions, the weak dominance case happens rarely.
Denote by Xi = e˜1,i + e˜0,i , the weakly dominant case happens only when
∑
j,i X j = 1. Potentially
there are infinitely many strategies that lead to this state. However, suppose agents’ reporting
strategies are drawn from a distribution defined over a continuous space (mixed strategy space),
then we can easily argue that {ω : ∑j,i X j (ω) = 1} (via taking ∑j,i X j as a random variable) is a
zero measure event.
Also we would like to point out that, as long as each agent believes that this uninformative state
happens with probability < 1, DTS induces strong dominant strategy in truthful reporting, as a
non-trivial mix between weak and strong dominance returns strong dominance.
Also, as a matter of fact,
∑
j,i X j = 1 corresponds to the case that the reference signal is
stochastically irrelevant to the ground truth. Theoretically speaking, there is little one can do for
eliciting private signals using such a reference signal, via a peer prediction method. In practice,
one can use screening tasks to remove some workers to move away from this uninformative state.
I.2 Effort exertion
So far our discussion focuses on eliciting truthful reports, our results extend to the scenario for
eliciting high quality data. For instance, when workers can choose to exert costly effort (consider a
binary effort level case, and denote the cost as c for exerting efforts) to improve the quality of their
answers, and once the reference signal is informative (either positively or negatively), we can scale
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up the scoring functions to cover the cost c , as similarly done in [10], to establish the dominance of
reporting a high-effort signal.
I.3 Heterogeneous error rates across tasks
In order to estimate error rates correctly, we needed to make the assumption that human workers
have homogeneous error rates across multiple tasks. We now discuss the applicability of our method
in light of the heterogeneity issue. Before starting, we would like to emphasize that in practice, for
each set of experiments we can choose to group tasks according to their types (e.g., image labeling,
solving puzzles, objects recognition), and run our mechanism over each group separately. For this
setting, we can assume the homogeneity more comfortably.
Nonetheless when it is not quite possible to group tasks together, suppose that each human
agent’s error rates are also task contingent in that for each possible task x with y ∼ P := {P0,P1}
we have e0,i (y), e1,i (y). Redefine the error rate of the reference answer as follows:
e1,z =
∑
j,i Ex,y |y=1[er1, j (x)]
N − 1 , e0,z =
∑
j,i Ex,y |y=0[er0, j (x)]
N − 1 .
Again e1,z , e0,z captures the error rate of the reference answer. With knowing e1,z , e0,z , the dominant
strategy argument in Theorem 4.3 holds.
So far so good. However it becomes less clear in how to estimate e1,z , e0,z . If we follow the idea
in Section 5.1, the first order equation holds as before
P0
∑
j,i Ex,y |y=0[er0, j (x)]
N − 1 + P1(1 −
∑
j,i Ex,y |y=1[er1, j (x)]
N − 1 ) = P1,−i ,
i.e., P0e0,z + P1(1 − e1,z ) = P1,−i . However the higher order matching statistics appear to be very
different. For example, the second order matching probability between two agents on label 1
becomes
P0
∑
j,i Ex,y |y=0[(er0, j (x))2]
N − 1 + P1
∑
j,i Ex,y |y=1[1 − (er1, j (x))2]
N − 1 = P1,−i ,
Instead we would like a equation as a function of(∑
j,i Ex,y |y=0[er0, j (x)]
N − 1
)2
,
(∑
j,i Ex,y |y=1[1 − er1, j (x)]
N − 1
)2
in order to identify the true error rates on average. To get around of this issue, we can adopt the
following approximation for (er )20, j (x) using Taylor expansion:
(er0, j (x))2 ≈ e20,z + 2e0,z (er0, j (x) − e0,z ) = 2e0,z · er0, j (x) − e20,z .
Then we claim that∑
j,i Ex,y |y=0[(er0, j (x))2]
N − 1 ≈
∑
j,i Ex,y |y=0[2e0,z · er0, j (x) − e20,z ]
N − 1
= 2e0,z · e0,z − e20,z = e20,z
Similarly we have ∑
j,i Ex,y |y=1[1 − (er1, j (x))2]
N − 1 ≈ (1 − e1,z )
2.
From above, we see we are able to recover the matching equations defined in our earlier solution
for task homogeneous cases; and it can be viewed as a linear approximation for this task contingent
case.
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I.4 A Machine Learning method
To echo recent works on using machine learning techniques [33] to learn a machine learning model
to generate a reference answer, instead soliciting from other agents, we show this idea is also ready
to be plugged into our SSR solution framework. Consider the current task that needs to be elicited
and denote its feature vector as x ∈ Rd . Suppose we have learned (following the results in [33],
such a classifier is learnable purely from agent’s reported noisy data) a good classifier f˜ ∗(x) for
predicting its true outcome. Replace the reference answer z with f˜ ∗(x) and plug in its error rates.
The rest of job is to reason about e1,z , e0,z (for f˜ ∗(x)). There are possibly many different ways to do
so.
Suppose that each task is associated with a corresponding feature vector. Consider the current
task that needs to be elicited and denote its feature vector as x ∈ Rd . Suppose we have learned
(following the results in [33], such a classifier is learnable purely from agent’s reported noisy data)
a good classifier f˜ ∗(x) for predicting its true outcome. Our ML-aided SSR simply works in the
following ways: replacing the reference answer z with f˜ ∗(x) and plug in its error rates. The rest
of job is to reason about e1,z , e0,z (for f˜ ∗(x)). There are possibly many different ways of doing so.
We demonstrate its possibility when there is again no ground truth label being available with the
following simple estimation procedure:
• Assign K tasks x1, x2, ..., xK to three randomly drawn peers, denote them as zrefi (xk ), i =
1, 2, 3, k = 1, 2, ...,K .
• Estimate Pr[ f˜ ∗(xi ) = zref1 (xi ) = 1] and Pr[ f˜ ∗(xi ) = 1].
• Estimate Pr[zref1 (xi ) = 1|y = 0] (follow Mechanism 1) using the three reference answers
zrefi (xk ), i = 1, 2, 3, k = 1, 2, ...,K .
Then note the following fact:
Pr[ f˜ ∗(xi ) = zref1 (xi ) = 1]
=P0 Pr[ f˜ ∗(xi ) = 1|y = 0] Pr[zref1 (xi ) = 1|y = 0]
+P1 Pr[ f˜ ∗(xi ) = 1|y = 1] Pr[zref1 (xi ) = 1|y = 1]
Together with
Pr[ f˜ ∗(xi ) = 1] = P0 Pr[ f˜ ∗(xi ) = 1|y = 0] + P1 Pr[ f˜ ∗(xi ) = 1|y = 1],
we will be able to solve for e1,z , e0,z when we have a good estimates of Pr[ f˜ ∗(xi ) = zref1 (xi ) = 1] and
Pr[ f˜ ∗(xi ) = 1], and that Pr[zref1 (xi ) = 1|y = 0] , Pr[zref1 (xi ) = 1|y = 1]. With above argument, we
see that we will be able to achieve dominant strategy scorings without even the need of reassigning
all tasks.
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J.1 Description of the datasets
Datasets Study 1a Study 1b Study 1c Study 2 Study 3 Study 4a Study 4b
# of questions 50 50 50 80 80 90 90
# of participants 51 32 33 39 25 21 20
type of participants lab lab lab AMT online lab lab
Table 2. Experiments results.
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J.2 Additional experiment results
We add experiment results for all other datasets. Since BTS scores are on a much smaller scale
compared to other scores, we scale up BTS scores by a constant, to make the comparison more
clear.
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Fig. 3. Experiment results on Study 1a.
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Fig. 4. Experiment results on Study 1b.
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Fig. 5. Experiment results on Study 1c.
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Fig. 6. Experiment results on Study 2.
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Fig. 7. Experiment results on Study 3.
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Fig. 8. Experiment results on Study 4a.
34 J EXPERIMENT RESULTS
Participants (ordered by their true scores)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 s
co
re
 a
cr
o
ss
 a
ll 
ta
sk
s
1/Prior:True
DTS
(a) Surrogate v.s. Truth: 1/Prior
Participants (ordered by their true scores)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 s
co
re
 a
cr
o
ss
 a
ll 
ta
sk
s
Brier:True
Brier:DTS
(b) Surrogate v.s. Truth: Brier
Participants (ordered by their true scores)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 s
co
re
 a
cr
o
ss
 a
ll 
ta
sk
s
1/Prior:True
PTS
(c) PTS v.s. Truth
Participants (ordered by their true scores)
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 s
co
re
 a
cr
o
ss
 a
ll 
ta
sk
s
1/Prior:True
BTS
(d) BTS v.s. Truth
Fig. 9. Experiment results on Study 4b.
